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What Did Unions Do in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain? 
GEORGE R. BOYER 
The article examines the development of the insurance function of trade unions. 
It analyzes how such policies worked, and why union benefit packages differed 
across occupations. It also addresses the impact of insurance policies on union 
organization. Insurance benefits increased the ability of unions to attract and 
retain members. They did not, however, significantly increase the power of union 
leaders relative to employers or union rank and file. 
Nineteenth-century British unions performed two distinct functions. Besides attempting to raise wages and improve working conditions, 
unions also provided their members with insurance against unemploy-
ment, sickness, and accidents, pensions for retired members, and 
"death benefits" to ensure workers and their wives a proper funeral. 
The insurance function of trade unionism has received little attention 
from historians, the most influential analysis appearing in Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb's Industrial Democracy. The Webbs focused on one 
aspect of "mutual insurance" policies, their impact on the strength of 
"working-class organisation." This article analyzes the economic role 
of mutual insurance. It describes how union benefit policies worked, 
and addresses several issues raised by the Webbs concerning the impact 
of benefit policies on the power of union leaders relative to employers 
and union rank and file. 
Both demand and supply factors influenced union decisions to adopt 
mutual insurance policies. Workers' demand for mutual insurance came 
mainly as a response to changes in government poor relief policies. The 
process of abolishing outdoor relief for unemployed able-bodied males 
began with the passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834, and 
was largely complete by I860.1 Many Poor Law unions extended the 
substitution of the workhouse for outdoor relief to sick and old paupers 
during the "Crusade against Outrelief that began in the 1870s.2 
Reliance on the state during times of "personal distress" became a 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2 (June 1988). © The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
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much less palatable option for workers, prompting them to insure 
themselves against loss of income through trade unions and friendly 
societies. The importance attached by workers to the insurance function 
of unions can be seen in the objectives listed in union rules. The Boiler 
Makers and Iron Ship Builders, for example, sought "to provide against 
a train of evils of the most serious magnitude, which evils, when they 
arise from any cause except sickness, are not provided for by any of the 
ordinary 'Benefit Societies'."3 
Supply factors also affected the adoption of mutual insurance poli-
cies. Union leaders viewed the provision of insurance benefits as a 
method for strengthening union organization. Insurance policies in-
creased the willingness of workers to join unions. According to the 
Webbs, "the prospect of securing support in sickness or unemployment 
is a greater inducement [for young men] to join the union . . . than the 
less obvious advantages to be gained by the trade combination."4 In 
addition, the promise of future benefits increased the ability of unions to 
retain members during downturns, thereby alleviating a problem that 
plagued unions throughout the nineteenth century. 
Although both worker demand for insurance and union leaders' desire 
to strengthen "working-class organisation" led to the widespread 
adoption of mutual insurance policies, the Webbs downplayed the role 
of demand. They concluded that union officials adopted benefit policies 
primarily to increase their power relative to employers and union rank 
and file. I confront the Webbs's hypothesis later, and turn now to the 
size and scope of union-supplied insurance benefits. 
Estimates of the total number of union members eligible for mutual 
insurance benefits are available only for the years 1893 and 1908. In 
1893, 744,000 members (59 percent of all union members) were eligible 
for unemployment benefits other than traveling benefits, 984,000 (77 
percent) for funeral benefits, 612,000 (48 percent) for sickness benefits, 
and 459,000 (36 percent) for old-age benefits.5 For 1908 data are 
available only for unemployment and sickness benefits; 1,474,000 union 
members were eligible for unemployment benefits (62 percent of all 
union members), and 729,000 (31 percent) were eligible for sickness 
benefits.6 The number eligible for old-age benefits was probably about 
700,000; for funeral benefits, perhaps 1,800,000. 
The relatively small number of union members eligible for sickness 
3
 Board of Trade, "Statistical Tables and Report on Trade Unions (1887)," Parliamentary 
Papers, 1887, vol. 89, p. 7. 
4
 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London, 1897), p. 158. 
5
 Data for 1893 from Board of Trade, "Seventh Annual Report on Trade Unions," Parliamentary 
Papers, 1895, vol. 107, p. 3. The numbers for unemployment and sickness benefits were adjusted 
to make them consistent with the 1908 data. 
6
 Board of Trade, "Report on Trade Unions in 1908-1910," Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13, vol. 
47, p. xxxv. 
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and old-age benefits is explained in part by the availability of sickness 
and old-age insurance from private mutual help associations known as 
friendly societies. In 1901, 4.14 million persons belonged to friendly 
societies providing sickness insurance (4.43 million persons in 1911).7 
Although few friendly societies officially provided old-age benefits, 
most provided them in effect by paying sickness benefits to old members 
unable to work.8 Friendly societies generally did not provide insurance 
against unemployment; only 28,000 persons belonged to friendly soci-
eties providing unemployment benefits in 19069 Workers anxious to 
insure themselves against unemployment had no choice but to do so 
through their union. 
A summary of the mutual insurance policies provided by four large 
unions as of 1893 is given in Table 1. Only the Engineers and the London 
Compositors provided unemployment insurance strictly speaking. The 
Durham Miners did not pay benefits to members laid off during 
downturns in trade. Members were eligible for benefits only if the 
colliery at which they worked stopped production "in consequence of 
alteration or breakage of machinery." The Operative Bricklayers' 
Society paid unemployment benefits only to members who were trav-
eling in search of work. Upon application, an unemployed member was 
given a cheque book, which entitled him to "Is. 6d. at any relieving 
station distant six miles from the place where such cheques were issued, 
or where last relief was received, except in some few specified towns 
where two days' relief in succession may be drawn . . . ."10 Traveling 
members were entitled to eight weeks of benefits, dating from the issue 
of the cheque book, in each half-year. 
The weekly payments to unemployed or sick workers were small 
relative to wage rates. For the unions in Table 1, the benefit-to-wage 
ratio varied from 0.30 for unemployed or sick miners to 0.47 for sick 
bricklayers. Moreover, the size of benefits declined as the duration of 
unemployment or sickness increased. The replacement rate for an 
engineer declined from 0.31 to 0.22 after 14 weeks of unemployment and 
to 0.19 after 44 weeks. 
Union benefit payments remained roughly constant from 1892 to 
1908, despite increases in (nominal and real) wage rates and in the cost 
of living. 1 In 1908 the typical unemployed worker in the metal, 
Paul Johnson, Saving and Spending (Oxford, 1985), p. 57. 
Bentley B. Gilbert, The Decay of Nineteenth-Century Provident Institutions and the Coming of 
Old Age Pensions in Great Britain," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 17 (Dec. 1964), pp. 556-57. 
9 
Jose Harris, Unemployment and Politics (Oxford, 1972), p. 295. 
Board of Trade, Agencies and Methods for Dealing with the Unemployed, Parliamentary 
Papers, 1893-94, vol. 82, pp. 42-43. 
1 1 
From 1891 to 1911, nominal (real) annual earnings of engineers increased by 17 percent (10 
percent), while nominal (real) earnings of skilled workers in the building trades increased by 15 
percent (8 percent). The cost of living increased by 5.8 percent from 1892 to 1908. Jeffrey G. 
Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality? (Boston, 1985), pp. 29, 220. 
TABLE 1 
MUTUAL INSURANCE P O L I C I E S F O R F O U R UNIONS, 1 8 9 2 
Union 
Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers 
Operative Bricklayers' 
Society 
London Society of 
Compositors 
Durham Miners' 
Association 
Weekly 
Contribution 
Is. 
7-9d. 
8d 
9d 
Unemployment 
Benefit 
(shillings/week) 
10s., 14 weeks 
7s., 30 weeks 
6s., 60 weeks 
ls.6d., 8 weeksa 
12s., 16 weeks 
10s., 52 weeksb 
Sickness Benefit 
(shillings/week) 
10s., 26 weeks 
5s., until recovery 
15s., 13 weeks 
9s., 13 weeks 
5s., until recovery 
no policy 
10s., 26 weeks 
5s., 26 weeks 
2s.6d., until recovery 
Old-Age Benefit0 
(shillings/week) 
25-year member, 7s. 
30-year member, 8s. 
35-year member, 9s. 
40-year member, 10s. 
15-year member, 5s. 
20-year member, 7s. 
30-year member, 9s. 
20-year member, 4s. 
25-year member, 5s. 
no policy 
Accident 
Benefit 
Up to £100 
Up to £50 
no policy 
no policy 
Funeral 
Benefit 
£12 
£15 
Up to £15 
£8 
Weekly 
Wage 
33s.4d. 
32s.7«/2d 
38s. 
33s.7d. 
Maximum 
Replacement 
Rated 
0.31 
0.47 
0.32 
0.30 
a
 Relief given only to members who were traveling in search of work. Figure given is shillings per day. 
b
 Relief given only "when collieries are idle for a clear week or more in consequence of alteration or breakage of machinery." 
c
 Eligibility at age 55. 
d
 Maximum benefit as a share of average weekly wage. 
Source: Royal Commission on Labour, "Rules of Associations of Employers and of Employed," Parliamentary Papers, 1892, vol. 36, pp. 31-32, 66-67, 153-54, 
261-62. 
to 
o 
British Unions and Benefits 323 
engineering, and building trades received a benefit of 9.25-10s. per 
week, too little to provide subsistence for a worker and his family.12 B. 
Seebohm Rowntree estimated that a family of four required a minimum 
weekly expenditure of 18s. lOd. in 1899. 3 The union benefit therefore 
had "to be supplemented . . . by the earnings of wife and children, by 
private saving, by assistance from fellow-workmen and neighbours, by 
running into debt, by pawning and in other ways."14 
One other aspect of union unemployment insurance policies should 
be noted, namely, the methods adopted to reduce the "moral hazard" 
associated with unemployment benefits. Unions with unemployment 
insurance policies had to determine whether applicants were in fact 
eligible for benefits, and whether benefit recipients were actively 
searching for work. Most craft unions could easily eliminate this moral 
hazard. The Amalgamated Engineers forced each applicant to make his 
claim for benefits at the next meeting of his branch. If the members 
present, some of whom were his fellow workmen, determined that he 
was not in fact eligible for benefits, he forfeited the benefits and was 
"liable to such other punishment as the branch may consider the case 
deserves." A worker deemed eligible for benefits had to "sign . . . the 
'vacant-book' of his branch once every day between certain hours" in 
order to collect relief. The branch secretary would direct an unem-
ployed member to any local firm in need of labor. A member who 
refused a job offered him, or who did not apply for a job when informed 
of a vacancy by the branch secretary, would forfeit his unemployment 
benefit unless he could "show sufficient cause" for his action at the next 
branch meeting.15 
Friendly societies could not reduce the moral hazard associated with 
unemployment insurance because their membership generally belonged 
to several occupations, and largely for this reason did not offer 
unemployment insurance. Contemporaries recognized the unique abil-
ity of unions to reduce moral hazard. William Beveridge wrote in 1909 
that unions "come nearer than any other bodies to possessing a direct 
test of unemployment by which to protect their funds against abuse. . . . 
They are better able, therefore, than anyone else at the present time to 
assist the unemployed on honourable terms without imminent risk of 
encouraging unemployment."16 
If unions were the only source of unemployment insurance, why 
12
 Board of Trade, "Trade Unions in 1908-10," p. xxxvi. 
13
 Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (2nd edn., London, 1902), p. 
110. The cost of living in 1899 was 4.3 percent below the cost of living in 1892, and 9.5 percent 
below the cost of living in 1908. Williamson, Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality?, p. 220. 
14
 William H. Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (London, 1909), p. 225. 
15
 Board of Trade, "Agencies and Methods," pp. 22-24. 
16
 Beveridge, Unemployment, p. 227. Similar conclusions were reached by the Webbs (Industrial 
Democracy, pp. 160-61) and by the minority report of the Royal Commission on Trades Unions 
(Parliamentary Papers, 1868-69, vol. 31, p. xliii). 
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didn't all unions provide it? Table 2 reveals that the availability and 
duration of unemployment benefits differed markedly across occupa-
tions. Virtually all union members in the metal, engineering, shipbuild-
ing, cotton, and printing trades were entitled to unemployment benefits, 
compared with fewer than 40 percent in mining and only 5 percent 
among members of "general unions" and dock, riverside, and builders' 
laborers. The numbers for mining and cotton are somewhat misleading. 
While all miners in Durham and Yorkshire were eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits, only 14 percent of the miners in the rest of Britain (70 
percent of all miners) were entitled to benefits. Similarly, while all 
workers in the cotton industry were eligible for some form of unem-
ployment insurance, only 23 percent were entitled to benefits if laid off 
because of "bad trade." Another 36 percent were entitled to benefits 
only during "mill stoppages," and 41 percent received benefits only if 
they were unemployed because of "breakdowns, fires, failures, etc." 
The data in Table 2 raises two issues: why didn't more unions of 
skilled workers in mining and cotton provide unemployment insurance 
for their members; and why didn't unions of low-skilled workers 
provide unemployment insurance? Workers in an occupation could 
share the risk associated with cyclical downturns in demand in three 
ways: unemployment insurance, work sharing, and downwardly flexible 
wage rates. The reduction of hours worked per week during downturns 
was a "regular practice" in mining and cotton spinning. In coal mining, 
"the pits remain open for varying numbers of days each week . . . 
according to the state of trade." For the period from 1895 to 1910 the 
average number of days worked per week varied from 4.74 (out of a 
possible 6) in 1895 to 5.51 in 1907. Because of work sharing among coal 
miners, fluctuations in demand "involve[d] hardly any dismissal of 
individual workmen and therefore substantially no acute distress." 
Similarly, the average work week of cotton spinners was reduced from 
55 to 40 hours during the 1903 recession.17 Another way for unions to 
avoid layoffs was to accept wage cuts during downturns. During the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, unions in coal mining, iron, and (to a 
lesser extent) cotton agreed to the adoption of sliding scales linking 
wage rates to product prices.18 Sliding scales enabled employers to 
reduce wages during periods of declining prices according to an agreed 
formula. The importance of sliding scales as a method of reducing risk 
was small, however, because most agreements stipulated that wages 
could decline by no more than 5 percent per year.1 Work sharing and 
sliding wage scales eliminated the need for unemployment insurance 
Beveridge, Unemployment, pp. 220-21. 
J. H. Porter, "Wage Bargaining under Conciliation Agreements, 1860-1914," Economic 
History Review, 2nd ser., 23 (Dec. 1970), pp. 466-75. 
Ibid., p. 473. 
TABLE 2 
M U T U A L I N S U R A N C E BENEFITS BY OCCUPATION 
Number of 
Unions with 
2,000+ Members Membership 
Number with 
Unemployment Percent of 
Benefits Members 
Number with Number 
Benefits for Percent of with Sick Percent of 
13+ Weeks Members Benefits Members 
Metal, engineering, and shipbuilding 
unions 
Building trades unions 
Mining and quarrying unions 
Cotton textile unions 
Printing and kindred trades unions 
General labor, dock and riverside 
labor, and builders' laborers 
unions 
Metal, engineering, and shipbuilding 
Building trades 
Mining and quarrying 
Cotton textiles 
Printing and kindred trades 
General labor, dock and riverside 
labor, and builders' laborers 
23 
11 
34 
32 
8 
14 
299,756 
153,187 
695,234 
211,767 
59,905 
157,657 
18 
6 
10a 
15b 
T 
18c 
32d 
Number with 
Accident Benefits 
20 
11 
8 
11 
3 
8 
Percent of 
Members 
96.7% 
100.0 
19.7 
34.0 
26.8 
71.6 
93.7% 
67.3 
37.8a 
b 
51.4 
22.6a 
59.3 
100.0d 
100.0 
5.1 
Number with 
Old-Age 
Benefits 
15 
9 
7 
3 
7 
4 
14 
2 
5a 
5b 
3a 
5C 
6d 
2 
0 
Percent of 
Members 
90.4% 
96.8 
17.1 
7.5 
88.1 
35.5 
15 
43.7 
22.8a 
b 
22.8 
11.2a 
18. r 
23.4 
11.8 
0.0 
Number with 
Funeral 
Benefits 
22 
11 
20 
29 
8 
12 
83.6% 
92.4 
17.4 
0.0 
15.0 
33.8 
a
 Unions providing benefits to workers who were laid off because of "bad trade." 
b
 Unions listed in (a) plus unions providing benefits only when workers were unemployed due to fires, explosions, stoppages or breakdowns of machinery. 
c
 Unions listed in (a) plus unions providing benefits only when workers were unemployed due to mill stoppages. 
d
 Unions listed in (a) and (c) plus unions providing benefits only when workers were unemployed due to "breakdowns, fires, failures, e t c . " 
Source: "Rules and Expenditure of Trade Unions in respect of Unemployment Benefits," Parliamentary Papers, 1911, vol. 73, pp. 18-228. 
2. 
Co 
Percent of 
Members 
99.0% 
100.0 
49.3 
89.5 
100.0 
78.6 
0 
Co 
ft-
&) 
Co 
03 
to 
OX 
89.3% 
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except during times when the mine or factory was shut down. This 
explains why 77 percent of cotton workers and 14 percent of miners 
were eligible for unemployment benefits only if they were unemployed 
because of fires, stoppages, or breakdowns or alterations of machin-
ery.20 
Historians have offered two explanations for the lack of unemploy-
ment insurance among unions of low-skilled workers. First, low-skilled 
workers could not afford the contributions associated with the provision 
of unemployment insurance. The Webbs wrote that unions of unskilled 
workers could "make no greater tax upon their miserable earnings than 
a penny or twopence per week."21 Second, most unions of low-skilled 
workers were formed in 1889 or soon after and therefore were part of the 
"New Unionism," which was ideologically far to the left of the "old" 
craft unions. According to G.D.H. Cole, most new unions "dispensed 
with friendly benefits altogether, and concentrated on the possession of 
funds for use in strikes and lock-outs and in the expenses of organizing 
and administration. Their leaders denounced friendly benefits as leading 
to stagnation and reaction in industrial policy."22 
Neither explanation is satisfactory. Many unionized low-skilled 
workers earned enough to afford the 3-7d. weekly contribution consid-
ered necessary to insure skilled workers against unemployment. The 
average gas stoker earned 36.6s. per week in 1906, and a typical building 
trades laborer working in a large city earned about 27s. per week.23 The 
weekly budgets of unskilled laborers in York and London collected by 
Seebohm Rowntree and by Maud Pember Reeves show that workers 
earning 20-25s. paid on average slightly more than Is. per week for 
sickness and burial insurance at a time when most skilled workers in 
trade unions paid Is.—Is. 3d. per week for unemployment, sickness, 
old-age, dispute, and funeral benefits.24 Clearly, gas workers and 
builders' laborers could afford to pay 7d. per week for unemployment 
insurance, and yet neither the National Union of Gas Workers nor any 
of the unions of builders' laborers provided it. 
The hypothesis that unions of low-skilled workers "denounced 
friendly benefits" is rejected by data in Table 2. In 1908 more than 70 
Members of the Yorkshire Miners' Association were entitled to benefits only if 25 percent of 
the workers at the seam had been unemployed for three weeks. This suggests that work sharing was 
used during all but the most severe recessions. Including the Yorkshire Miners increases to 25 
percent the share of miners eligible for unemployment benefits only when the mine was shut down 
21
 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London, 1894), p. 415. 
22
 G.D.H. Cole, A Short History of the British Working Class Movement (New York, 1927), vol. 
2, p. 162 
23
 Wage data for gas stokers from Frank Popplewell, "The Gas Industry," in Sidney Webb and 
Arnold Freeman, eds., Seasonal Trades (London, 1912), p. 191. Wage data for laborers in the 
building trades from Board of Trade, "Report into the Earnings and Hours of Labour. Ill— 
Building and Woodworking Trades," Parliamentary Papers, 1910, vol. 84, p. 25. 
24
 Rowntree, Poverty, p. 244; Maud Pember Reeves, Round About a Pound a Week (London, 
1913), pp. 80-88. 
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percent of unionized low-skilled workers were entitled to accident and 
funeral benefits, and one-third were eligible for sickness and old-age 
benefits. Many of the new unions rejected friendly benefits when they 
were formed, but began adopting mutual insurance policies soon after 
1889. They did not, however, adopt unemployment insurance. 
Three factors precluded the adoption of unemployment insurance by 
unions of low-skilled workers: the seasonality of employment; workers' 
lack of occupation-specific skills; and firms' hiring practices. Most 
unionized low-skilled occupations experienced sharp seasonal fluctua-
tions in employment. The average number of gas workers employed 
from April through September was 15.3 percent below the number 
employed in December.25 The seasonal unemployment rate among 
builders' laborers averaged 12.5 percent from October through March, 
while that of London dock workers averaged 10.5 percent from Febru-
ary through September.26 These high seasonal unemployment rates 
made the provision of unemployment insurance expensive; the weekly 
contribution necessary to ensure unemployed gas workers a weekly 
benefit of 10s. was significantly larger than the 3-7d. premium of skilled 
workers. 
The problem of seasonality was complicated by the fact that low-
skilled workers lacked occupation-specific skills.2 If laid off, a skilled 
worker was virtually assured of being rehired when prosperity returned 
because the supply of labor in his occupation was fixed in the short run. 
An unemployed builders' laborer, on the other hand, was not assured of 
being rehired because the number of low-skilled laborers looking for 
employment in the building trades often exceeded the demand for labor 
even during peak seasons. Jobs as builders' laborers required few 
specific skills and were therefore open to unemployed dock workers, 
gas stokers, and other unskilled workers. 
Employers responded to workers' lack of specific skills by adopting 
hiring practices that attracted a "chronic over-supply of casual 
labour."28 Builders' laborers were hired by the job, and many dock 
workers were hired by the day. The resultant irregularity of employ-
ment increased the cost of unemployment insurance for two reasons. 
25Popplewell, "Gas Industry," p. 196. 
26
 Monthly unemployment data for builders' laborers from Augustus Webb, "The Building 
Trade," in Webb and Freeman, eds., Seasonal Trades, p. 334. Unemployment data for dock 
workers from Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, "Appendix, Vol. IX, Unemployment," 
Parliamentary Papers, 1910, vol. 49, p. 647. 
27
 Seasonality also was a problem for skilled workers in the building trades. The fact that these 
workers commanded occupation-specific human capital explains why their unions were able to 
provide unemployment insurance while unions of low-skilled workers were not. Still, the high cost 
of unemployment insurance restricted the provision of benefits. Only one union in the building 
trades, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, allowed members to collect benefits 
for more than 13 weeks per year. 
28
 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission Part II 
(London, 1909), p 196. 
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The existence of casual (presumably non-union) laborers at building 
sites and at the docks raised the average unemployment rate among 
union members. In addition, the irregularity of employment created a 
serious moral-hazard problem. Unions of builders' laborers and espe-
cially dock workers had no way of determining whether unemployed 
members were actively searching for work. A branch secretary could 
force unemployed members to sign a "vacant book" each day and 
direct members to building sites or docks thought to be looking for 
workers, but hiring practices prevented the secretary from determining 
whether members had genuinely sought work. 
In sum, seasonality and a "chronic over-supply of casual labour" 
raised the cost of unemployment insurance for low-skilled workers 
substantially above the weekly premium paid by skilled workers and 
above what they could afford to pay. The high cost, in combination with 
the moral-hazard problem caused by employers' hiring practices, ex-
plains why so few low-skilled workers had unemployment insurance. 
Whether unions were occupation-specific or general also affected the 
provision of unemployment insurance. General unions, which included 
workers from various occupations, experienced problems with unem-
ployment insurance that occupation-specific unions avoided. First, their 
members faced relatively heterogeneous unemployment risk, which 
raised possibly divisive issues concerning the finance of unemployment 
benefits: should members' contributions to the union be tied to the 
probability of unemployment, and if so, how should that probability be 
measured? Second, general unions were not able to eliminate moral-
hazard problems as easily as were occupation-specific unions. It was 
difficult for general unions to determine whether applicants were eligible 
for unemployment benefits and whether benefit recipients were actively 
searching for work. 
Many of the "new" unions founded in 1889 or soon after began as 
general unions of low-skilled workers. Perhaps the lack of unemploy-
ment insurance among low-skilled workers was caused, in part, by their 
belonging to general unions. But the unions soon became general in 
name only. According to Eric Hobsbawm, "between 1892 and 1911, 
[general unions] depended far more on their foothold in certain indus-
tries and large works than on their ability to recruit indiscriminately 
. . . ."
29
 The special problems of general unions cannot, therefore, 
explain low-skilled unions' lack of unemployment benefits. 
What impact did insurance policies have on the strength of union 
organization and the power of union leaders? The Webbs concluded that 
union leadership adopted insurance policies primarily to strengthen 
"working-class organisation." Unions benefited from the provision of 
mutual insurance in several ways. Insurance benefits were "a potent 
Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men (London, 1964), p. 187. 
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attraction to hesitating recruits." They also were "a powerful instru-
ment for maintaining discipline among the members, and for enforcing 
upon all the decisions of the majority."30 Members who had contributed 
to the benefit fund for several years would not risk expulsion from the 
union when that meant the forfeiture of old-age and funeral benefits.31 
Similarly, the Webbs argued that unions adopted unemployment bene-
fits in order to keep unemployed members from being "driven by 
necessity to accept" wages below the standard rate and thereby 
undermining any gains achieved by the union during prosperous times. 2 
Finally, unions used members' contributions to benefit funds to enhance 
their bargaining power with employers because most unions did not 
separate members' weekly contributions into trade and benefit funds. 
By increasing the size of contributions, the provision of insurance 
enabled unions "to roll up an imposing reserve fund, . . . which can be 
used in support of its trade policy in time of need, and . . . even if not 
actually drawn upon, is found to be an effective 'moral influence' in 
negotiations with employers."33 
Historians have largely accepted the Webbs's conclusions, but I 
believe they are overstated. Mutual insurance policies doubtless at-
tracted young workers to unions. But the power of friendly benefits to 
maintain "discipline among the members" needs to be qualified. Young 
workers who had belonged to a union for only a few years had 
contributed little to the benefit fund and therefore stood to lose little 
from expulsion. For workers aged between 30 and 45 the impact of 
expulsion, in terms of future benefits lost, depended largely on whether 
the union provided old-age benefits. The prospect of losing a pension of 
8-10s. per week was a strong inducement to members to go along with 
"the decisions of the majority."34 But fewer union members were 
eligible for old-age benefits than for any other benefit offered by unions, 
so the majority of middle-aged workers stood to lose little from 
expulsion. Only workers over 45 were bound to their unions by benefit 
policies, because most friendly societies (and unions) did not admit 
persons over 45. A 50-year-old worker expelled from a union could not 
obtain funeral, sickness, or old-age benefits, and would therefore 
probably have to spend his last years in a workhouse. 
The conclusion that unemployment benefits kept unemployed work-
ers from accepting jobs at wages below the standard rate also needs to 
be qualified. The typical unemployment benefit was just large enough 
Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy, p. 158. 
31 II " 
Benefits were not vested. A union member expelled for any reason forfeitfed] all claim to 
benefits (Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy, p. 154). 
Ibid., pp. 161-63. 
Ibid., p. 158. 
34 ' 
The prospect of losing sickness and funeral benefits had a much smaller impact on workers 
decisions, since such benefits could be obtained from friendly societies. 
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for a worker to subsist, with the aid of his wife's and children's earnings 
and his private savings. But a young worker whose children were not 
old enough to work and who probably had no more than £2-3 in a 
savings account could have survived on unemployment benefits for only 
a few weeks.35 Recognizing this, a few unions paid higher benefits to 
workers with young children.36 The general inadequacy of a 10s.-per-
week benefit is demonstrated by the fact that many union members 
obtained additional insurance by joining friendly societies. William 
Allan, the secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, com-
mented in 1867 that a "great many" of the union's members "find that 
10s. a week is not sufficient for them in sickness, and . . . as a rule the 
members of our society join other benefit societies . . . in order to have 
a sufficient amount during illness.37 Twenty-five of the 34 union mem-
bers eligible for sickness benefits that Rowntree surveyed also belonged 
to friendly societies providing sickness benefits.38 The fact that union 
members could not obtain additional unemployment insurance from 
friendly societies suggests that many found their income when unem-
ployed to be inadequate. In sum, while unemployment benefits made it 
easier for unemployed union members to subsist, the typical benefit was 
too small to affect significantly unions' ability to avoid wage cuts. The 
standard rate was maintained less by the provision of unemployment 
insurance than by union rules forbidding an unemployed member "to 
accept work on any but the conditions satisfactory to his branch."39 
The effect of unions' policies to maintain one reserve fund rather than 
separate benefit and trade funds also is not as straightforward as the 
Webbs suggest. Employers who testified before the 1867-69 Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions maintained that unions used members' 
benefit contributions to finance strikes. Most union leaders who testi-
fied, however, claimed that the combination of funds led to a reduction 
in strike activity, for the simple reason that union members were 
anxious not to deplete their benefit funds. In the words of William Allan, 
"a man who expects to get a certain amount of money as superannua-
tion [old-age] or sick benefit will be very careful about proceeding so far 
as a trade dispute."40 The minority report of the Royal Commission 
Data on the size of balances of Post Office Savings Bank accounts are given in Johnson, Saving 
and Spending, p. 101. Assuming that no working-class households had balances larger than £50, the 
data suggest that the median household balance was less than £4. If balances increased with age, 
the typical young worker's balance must have been no more than £2-3. 
Several miners' unions paid an additional Is. per week for each child under 13. Several 
branches of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners also paid additional 
benefits to workers with young children. 
37 T " " 
Royal Commission on rades Unions, Eleventh and Final Report, Parliamentary Papers, 
1868-69, vol. 31, p. 218. 
Rowntree, Poverty, p. 357. 
The existence of such rules is discussed in Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy, pp. 
164-65. 
Royal Commission on Trades Unions, "Eleventh Report," p. 217. 
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concluded that the separation of funds would deprive "the unionist of 
every motive which he now has not to expend his funds in strikes . . . 
and [therefore] greatly . . . stimulate both strikes and disputes."41 This 
view was accepted by J. M. Ludlow and E. W. Brabrook, the Chief 
Registrars of Friendly Societies from 1875 to 1891 and from 1891 to 1904 
respectively, and by John Burnett, the Chief Labour Correspondent of 
the Board of Trade, who maintained that "[a] trade society without 
friendly benefits is like a standing army. It is a constant menace to 
peace."42 It was also accepted by the leaders of the New Unionism of 
1889, who initially rejected mutual insurance because of its "enervating 
influences" on union members.43 
Which view is correct? Once again, it is useful to compare the effect 
of the combination of funds on the behavior of old and young union 
members. For older workers the combination of funds increased the 
expected cost of strikes by more than it increased the expected benefits. 
Older workers had relatively few years to enjoy the possible benefits 
obtained from a strike. On the other hand, they contributed to the 
benefit fund for years in order to secure sickness, funeral, and perhaps 
pension benefits for their old age. Strikes threatened the size or even the 
existence of these benefits. Young workers had less to lose from the 
depletion of the union's reserve fund. They were sick less often than 
older members, and their demand for funeral or pension benefits was far 
in the future.44 Moreover, they had many years to reap the benefits that 
might be obtained from a strike backed by a large reserve fund. Thus, 
the impact of the combination of funds largely depended on who 
controlled the union. Unions dominated by young workers probably 
became more militant, while unions dominated by older workers 
probably became more cautious. 
Of course, the combination of funds might have increased unions' 
bargaining power even if it made members more cautious. The testi-
mony before the 1867-69 Royal Commission shows that many employ-
ers believed that unions used their benefit funds to finance strikes. The 
expected increase in the duration and cost of strikes might have led 
Royal Commission on Trades Unions, "Minority Report," Parliamentary Papers, 1868-69, 
vol. 31, p. xlix. 
Quoted in Webb and Webb, Industrial Democracy, p. 160. 
The adoption of mutual insurance policies by many "new" unions in the 1890s is not evidence 
that union leaders changed their opinion on this issue. New unions adopted insurance policies in 
order to attract and retain members (Richard Hyman, The Workers' Union [Oxford, 1971], pp. 
14-16, 34). 
The average male aged 20 to 29 lost less than one week of work per year due to sickness 
(L. G. Chiozza Money, Insurance versus Poverty [London, 1912], p. 169). Young workers mainly 
needed insurance against unemployment, and strikes generally did not threaten unemployment 
benefits. According to the Webbs, "[a] Trade Union . . . gives a preference, in effect, to its Out of 
Work payments, usually continuing them at the full rate, even when its funds are being rapidly 
exhausted . . ." {Industrial Democracy, p. 161). Thus, the expected cost of strikes (in terms of 
benefits lost) was low for young workers. 
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employers to concede most union demands, making strikes unneces-
sary. But any increase in unions' bargaining power brought about by the 
combination of funds was short-lived. Over time employers began to 
realize that the combination of funds reduced union militancy. By the 
1890s employers had abandoned "the criticisms of their predecessors in 
1867," and had come to believe that the most militant unions were those 
without insurance benefits.45 
The provision of insurance did not significantly increase unions' 
bargaining power with firms or union leaders' control over rank and file. 
It did, however, strengthen union organization by leading workers to 
join unions and remain members during recessions. It also might have 
enabled union leaders to reduce unofficial strikes by branches in unions 
where benefit funds were controlled by the central leadership.46 But the 
driving force behind the adoption of benefit policies was workers' 
demand for insurance resulting from changes in government Poor Law 
policy. 
The adoption of national old-age pensions in 1908 and national health 
and unemployment insurance in 1911 reduced the insurance function of 
unions. But the benefits paid by national insurance were small, and most 
unions continued to provide insurance benefits throughout the interwar 
period. It was not until the postwar development of the welfare state 
that the majority of unions ended their mutual insurance policies. 
Ibid., p. 160. 
It is not possible to determine the proportion of unions in which benefit funds were controlled 
by the central leadership. In the Amalgamated Engineers, a model for many unions, branches 
retained their own funds (Webb and Webb, History of Trade Unionism, pp. 220-21). 
